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Abstract
Licensing is one of the main channels for technology transfer from foreign-
owned multinational enterprises (MNEs) to domestic plants. This transfer occurs
within industries and across industries, which results in technology spillovers that
can a↵ect both intra- and inter-industry productivity. We propose a theoreti-
cal model that predicts that this e↵ect can be enhanced by the implementation
of stronger intelectual property rights (IPR). Using Chilean plant-level data for
the 2001–2007 period and exogenous variation from a reform in 2005, we test
our theoretical predictions and find positive inter-industry e↵ects, which result in
higher productivity for domestic plants. However, there are negative spillovers
when licensing is implemented within the same industry. We also test for the
e↵ect of stronger IPR and find that stronger IPR reduces intra-sector spillovers
but increases inter-industry spillovers. Moreover, the IPR e↵ect is stronger on
firms that are, on average, smaller and have low productivity. Our results are
robust not only to a series of definitions of IPR, licensing and productivity but
also to a set of di↵erent specifications.
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I. Introduction
Productivity gaps can explain di↵erences in economic growth across countries; numer-
ous studies have demonstrated the importance of technology transfer to reducing the
productivity gap between developed and developing nations (see, for example, Mon-
talvo and Yafeh (1994)). While there can be many ways in which technology can be
transferred from one country to another, the role of technology transfers from a multina-
tional enterprise (MNE) has gained importance both in policy making and the academic
arena, especially over the past thirty years. The main channels through which MNEs
transfer technology to a host country are foreign direct investment (FDI), licensing, and
imports. The importance of FDI and imports for economic growth and productivity
due to the technology transfers they deliver has been shown in many studies (see, for
example, Blalock and Gertler (2008), and Alfaro et al. (2006)).
Less is known about the licensing channel, especially in developing and emerging
economies. Thus, we will focus on licensing as a channel for technology transfer given
the importance of this channel in developing countries, which have introduced various
policies to attract foreign participation. As Zanatta et al. (2008) note, clear examples
of this trend are the recent economic opening of China, the amendment to the Indian
Law of Patents in 2002 and the liberalization of most aspects of FDI in India.
Moreover, with the increasing importance of intangible assets in the current state
of economic globalization, technology transfer, either through licensing or FDI, may be
enhanced by the implementation of stronger intellectual property rights (IPR) legisla-
tion that a↵ects the decisions of MNEs.1 In fact, the awareness of the importance of
IPR has increased over the last twenty years due to the implementation of the Agree-
ment on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) in 1995 by
members of the World Trade Organization (WTO). As stated by the WTO, “it (the
agreement) establishes minimum levels of protection that each government has to give
to the intellectual property of fellow WTO members.”2 Nevertheless, controversy per-
sists over the e↵ect of strengthening IPR on the welfare of the host economy. On one
side, stronger IPR provides the protection necessary for production to shift and increase
in a developing country (the “market e↵ect”) and thus release resources in developed
countries to further advance the technological frontier. On the other side, stronger IPR
reduce the ability of local firms in the host economy to imitate new technologies and
create a “monopoly e↵ect” that reduces the incentive for investment or licensing in the
foreign a liate.3
To examine the e↵ects of licensing on productivity and the potential enhancing
e↵ect of IPR, we extend the theoretical model of Maskus et al. (2005) and test its
1 Branstetter et al. (2006) and Branstetter et al. (2007) analyze the various e↵ects of IPR reforms
on growth and productivity in di↵erent countries.
2 For further information, see the World Trade Organization website.
3 Lai (1998), Yang and Maskus (2001) provide a complete discussion on the benefits of IPR.
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implications using Chilean manufacturing data for the 2001–2007 period. To better
identify the IPR e↵ect, we exploit an exogenous change produced by a 2005 IPR re-
form in Chile that includes significant changes to IPR legislation and implementation.
Therefore, this represents an extremely favorable opportunity to gauge the e↵ect of an
IPR change. There are four important contributions made in this paper. First, we
propose a theoretical model that helps to understand the e↵ects of IPR on technology
transfer. Second, using data from Chile, we empirically examine the e↵ect of a change
in IPR, which might a↵ect MNEs’ choice of entry mode and, thus, the level of licensing.
Third, considering the new developments in the field of productivity measurement, this
study uses a di↵erent and more accurate productivity estimation technique compared
to earlier studies. Fourth, it is possible to determine di↵erent magnitudes of spillover
e↵ects depending on the productivity level of the firm as in Damijan et al. (2008).
Our results show that increasing the strength of patent laws in Chile led to smaller
backward spillover e↵ects in the economy. This may primarily be because stricter and
better-enforced laws reduce incentives for people to copy foreign technology when they
may face a stronger penalty for doing so. Moreover, the IPR policy seemed to “harm”
firms with lower productivity and smaller firms, which may have benefited more from
spillover e↵ects.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section two provides some
foundations and presents our theoretical model that motivates the empirical study.
Details about the data used are explained in section four, while the empirical strategy
and analysis are reported in sections five and six. Section seven concludes the paper.
II. Where do we stand? A Brief Review of the Existing Literature
Our conceptual framework is based on the established literature on technological trans-
fer and property rights to explain the enhancing e↵ect of IPR on the spillover e↵ects of
licensing on productivity.
As Maskus et al. (2005) note, MNEs have the choice to transfer technology through
FDI or licensing. This transfer of technology may be enhanced (or reduced) by various
factors and conditions such as the institutional capacity of the host country and the
country’s legal structure and IPR (Yang and Maskus (2001) and Canavire et al. (2017));
this last factor raises the cost of imitation in the host country; thus, it increases both
modes of entry. Moreover, as argued by Yang and Maskus (2001), increasing IPR allows
for higher levels of licensing since it is easier to enforce existing contracts.
The dearth of quality evidence on the e↵ects of licensing on productivity has fueled
the general debate regarding the potential spillover e↵ects of licensing on firm pro-
ductivity, as most of the evidence has focused on FDI e↵ects. In fact, the consistent
evidence of the positive spillover e↵ects of FDI attracted the attention to the benefits
of this mode of entering a market, which sometimes dulls the potential e↵ects of licens-
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ing, especially in developing and emerging economies. Javorcik (2004a) and Damijan
et al. (2008), contribute to the understanding of the e↵ects of multinational activity on
inter-industry spillovers. Using Lithuanian data and European data, they find positive
spillover e↵ects from FDI on upstream industries (backward spillover e↵ects) but no
significant evidence in downstream industries (forward spillover e↵ects) or within the
same industry.
However, as Kathuria (2000) notes, most studies that examine spillover e↵ects might
be underestimating the e↵ect of foreign presence if they treat FDI as the sole channel
for spillovers. Alvarez et al. (2002) find that local spending on licensing has a high level
of return. Thus, the “investment” made in licensing improved the performance and
productivity of Chilean firms during the 1990s. Moreover, as noted by Lopez (2008),
the e↵ects of licensing do not only apply to the same industry; there are also inter-
industry e↵ects. Therefore, it is important to realize that spillovers do not only appear
in the same industry. As Blalock and Gertler (2008) argue, the transfer of technology
to upstream sectors has to be to the sector as a whole to prevent a hold-up problem.4
Moreover, if there is more technology in upstream sectors, then there are lower input
prices, which in turn increase the incentives for other firms to enter the sector. Those
authors report that this increased competition results in lower prices in the sector and
is thus Pareto improving.
As mentioned above, the closest study to ours is Lopez (2008), who studies whether
plants benefit from foreign technology licensing by plants in either the same industry
or in other industries. He finds that licensing, when it is located in upstream sectors,
has a positive e↵ect on productivity for firms in downstream sectors. This might be
due to lower prices being o↵ered for final goods. However, when licensing is located in
downstream sectors, it has a negative impact on the productivity of upstream sectors.
The intuition behind this result is that it is possible that firms that acquire a license
are also contracting imported intermediate goods as inputs to their production process.
Thus, this reduces the spillover e↵ect for other firms in upstream sectors.
We can use figure 1 to better understand the concept of having licenses in one sector
while having productivity spillovers in another sector. One example of the possibility
for spillovers is the US MNE GNC Live Well, which o↵ers pharmaceutical products in
Chile (vitamins, diet supplements, etc.). This MNE has issued 115 di↵erent licensees in
Chile to make various products. In this case, the licensees can be a source of backward
spillovers since they could potentially use generic products produced by local firms as
inputs. Moreover, this particular example could also be a source of forward linkages,
as GNC could provide chemical components to other firms and induce an increase in
their productivity. Another example of spillovers for the Chilean economy is the US
MNE Burger King, which produces fast food. This MNE has been in Chile for 11 years
and issued 22 di↵erent licensees. In this case, it is likely that licensee firms in Chile use
4 A technology transfer cannot be to to the supplier alone because the supplier could then potentially
benefit from charging higher prices to the MNE. Thus the technology has to be made widely available.
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intermediates from Chilean providers, such as food and beverages from local providers,
packing containers of a given quality and so forth. This could create backward spillovers
in the economy.5 Similarly, the Canadian MNE Bubble Gummers produces apparel for
children. This MNE has been in Chile for 32 years, with 42 di↵erent stores licensed to
sell products with its branding. Here, licensee firms in Chile use intermediates such as
cotton of a given quality or rubber for the soles of shoes.
Figure 1: Spillover E↵ects of Licensing
From the left-hand side of the figure, we observe that if licenses are issued in the
downstream sector (auto manufacturing), then it is plausible to imagine technology
transfer to the upstream sector (i.e. type of tire, width, etc.). Thus, there could be
some spillover e↵ects that increase the productivity of the upstream sector. Throughout
this paper, we will refer to these spillovers as licenses in downstream sectors (backward
linkages).
However, if licensing is done in upstream sectors, it is possible that downstream
sectors benefit through lower prices or higher quality, for example. In this case, we
would refer to spillovers from licenses in upstream sectors (forward linkages).
III. Theoretical Framework
Our theoretical model is an extension of that presented by Maskus et al. (2005). Their
original model concerns a multinational’s choice of entry mode (either through FDI or
licensing) in which an MNE has to be indi↵erent between FDI and licensing. Thus,
after the entry decision has been made, there are two types of firms in the host economy
that have a direct link with the MNE: FDI firms and licensees.
We argue that it is necessary to introduce linkages that can produce backward
spillovers in the host economy. Bringing in such linkages, and thus the possibility of
5 For further examples, see www.franquicia.cl/nacionales.html
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intra-industry spillovers, requires an intermediate good industry. Following Markusen
and Venables (1999), there are three types of firms in the host country: domestic
suppliers of intermediate goods (pi, xi), foreign firms that undertake FDI (p⇤i , x
⇤
i ), and
domestic firms that receive licenses (pL, xL). In addition, there are also firms located
abroad that produce intermediate goods, which can be used in the host economy but
only through either FDI or licensing (pF , xF ). Following Maskus et al. (2005), the fixed
cost of production for firms in the final goods industry takes the following form:
Fj = Kj + cj(k) for j = F, L
Where Kj are production-related costs (independent of IPR), and cj(k) is a contractual
cost that depends on the strength of IPR (k). Since it is plausible to think that
MNEs incur higher fixed costs through the need to establish distribution channels, gain
knowledge of the market, and so forth, it is assumed that FF > FL. Following Yang
and Maskus (2001), we assume that the contractual costs of both FDI and licensing
decline with the level of IPR, that is: dcjdk < 0. However, it is reasonable to suppose
that these costs decline with k faster for licensing than for FDI:    dcF (k)dk
     <     dcL(k)dk
    
This is a plausible assumption because licensees have a comparative advantage relative
to FDI firms since they have greater knowledge of the contract enforcement mechanisms
in the host country.
III.I Technology
Let FDI and licensing firms have a constant returns to scale (CRS) Cobb-Douglas
production function, using labor and intermediate goods in the host country as inputs:
xj =l
1 ↵
j q
↵
j for j = L, F
Where lj is labor, and qj is a composite intermediate input that also requires labor
(following Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and Ethier (1982)). The production function of
intermediate goods is assumed to be a CES function that uses intermediate goods from
the domestic economy and from abroad.
qj =
⇥
µj(k)x
✓
ij + (1  µj(k))x⇤ij✓
⇤1/✓
Where ✓ is the elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods, xij is the amount
of intermediate goods (either domestic or imported) needed to produce a unit of good
j, and there is an e ciency parameter µ(k) that represents the e ciency of domestic
inputs. The crucial link between IPR strength and the e ciency parameter is that when
there is stronger IPR, it is plausible that both FDI and licensing firms have access to
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greater varieties of intermediate inputs (which might even be better in terms of quality);
thus, the relative e ciency of domestic intermediate goods is reduced.
It is also plausible to assume that FDI firms have greater access to intermediates
from the home country. That is, µF < µL. Furthermore, an increase in IPR strength
negatively a↵ects the requirement for domestic goods, as explained above (firms will
transfer more goods from abroad); thus, dµj(k)dk < 0. Here again it seems likely that an
increase in IPR will a↵ect FDI firms more than licensing firms, perhaps because MNEs
access a greater range of intermediate goods that could be sent to the host country.
Thus we assume the following:     dµF (k)dk
     >     dµL(k)dk
    
The operating profit function is given by
⇡j =pjxj   pixij   p⇤ix⇤ij   wlj for j = L, F
⇡j =pjl
1 ↵
j
⇥
µj(k)x
✓
ij + (1  µj(k))x⇤ij✓
⇤↵/✓   pixij   p⇤ix⇤ij   wlj (1)
III.II Decision between FDI and licensing and spillover e↵ects
As Maskus et al. (2005) note, new technology brought into the country either by FDI or
licensing has two inherent risks. First, any technology could be supplanted by a newer
technology through innovation competition. In particular, if there is a large pool of
potential innovators and their innovation incentives are unchanged by changes in IPR
in the host country, then it is appropriate to assume that successful innovation follows
a Poisson process with arrival parameter i. Second, technology can be imitated in the
host country. This is equally likely for FDI and licensing. We assume that successful
imitation also follows a Poisson process with arrival parameter m(k), where dmdk < 0.
That is, having stronger IPR reduces the rate of imitation.
MNEs choose between FDI and licensing, which means that a firm must be indif-
ferent between these alternatives in equilibrium. Thus, the operating profits from FDI
are higher than those from licensing to compensate for the higher fixed cost of FDI.
Thus, ⇡F > ⇡L. To more carefully demonstrate this equilibrium, we need to compare
the discounted value of assets in the two cases. With a discount rate equal to r, we
have
VF =
⇡F
i+m(k) + r
  FF and VL = ⇡L
i+m(k) + r
  FL
The firm will engage in FDI if VF > VL. Then, the indi↵erence point occurs where
VF   VL = 0:
⇡F
i+m(k) + r
  FF = ⇡L
i+m(k) + r
  FL (2)
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Equation (2) can be written as follows:
 ⇡ =(i+m(k) + r) F (k) = (m(k) + r) F (k) + i F (k) (3)
Where  ⇡ = ⇡F   ⇡L > 0, and  F (k) = FF (k)   FL(k) > 0. Note that equation (3)
is a straight line in the  ⇡, i plane with intercept (m(k) + r) F (k) and slope  F (k).
This line is depicted as L0 in figure 2. Consider a point above L0, that is,  ⇡ > 0. Thus,
Figure 2: FDI and Licensing Decision with Variable Innovation
Source: Maskus et al. (2005).
⇡F > ⇡L, and it is more profitable for the MNE to enter the host economy through
FDI. That is, if the firm is above L0, then it will choose FDI over licensing. However,
if the firm is below L0, it will choose licensing over FDI.
Now consider the impact of strengthening IPR on the choice between FDI and
licensing. In this case, Maskus et al. (2005) report two direct e↵ects. First, it will a↵ect
the slope of the line L0, and second, it will a↵ect the intercept of this line. However,
in the current model, there will be a third e↵ect due to the presence of IPR in the
operational profit function:
d(⇡F   ⇡L)
dk
=
d((m(k) + r) F (k))
dk
+
id F (k)
dk
(4)
First, the cost of imitation increases and the rate of imitation m(k) would decline.
Second, the fixed costs of both FDI and licensing would decline. However, the reduction
would be greater for licensing since we assume the following:    dcF (k)dk
     <     dcL(k)dk
     ) d Fdk = dcFdk   dcLdk > 0
Third, for the LHS of (1), we have
d(⇡F   ⇡L)
dk
=
d⇡F
dk
  d⇡L
dk
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Since the only terms included here that have (k) in them are related to the domestic
and foreign intermediate input requirements, d(⇡F ⇡L)dk would give the e↵ect on backward
spillovers of a change in IPR. Thus, for d⇡Fdk , we have
d⇡F
dk
=pF l
(1 ↵)
F
↵
✓
⇥
µF (k)x
✓
iF + (1  µF (k))x⇤iF ✓
⇤(↵ ✓)/✓ dµF (k)
dk
x✓iF  
dµF (k)
dk
x⇤
✓
iF
=⌦F
dµF (k)
dk
⇣
x✓iF   x⇤✓iF
⌘
Where
⌦F =pF l
(1 ↵)
F
↵
✓
⇥
µF (k)x
✓
iF + (1  µF (k))x⇤iF ✓
⇤(↵ ✓)/✓
> 0
Therefore,
d⇡F
dk
=⌦F
dµF (k)
dk
⇣
x✓iF   x⇤✓iF
⌘
? 0 and d⇡L
dk
= ⌦L
dµL(k)
dk
⇣
x✓iL   x⇤✓iL
⌘
? 0
The term d(⇡F ⇡L)dk could therefore be either positive or negative. The intuition is as
follows. If this term is positive, it would mean that having stronger IPR leads to
an increase in  ⇡ = ⇡F   ⇡L. Then, it is more profitable to engage in FDI than in
licensing. As a result, there will be a strongly negative e↵ect on the demand for domestic
intermediate goods, as FDI firms now demand lower levels of domestic intermediate
inputs. In turn, there would be smaller backward spillovers.
If d(⇡F ⇡L)dk is negative, FDI would be less profitable than licensing and the latter
would rise. However, this outcome would also imply a negative e↵ect on the demand
for domestic intermediate goods, which leads to smaller backward spillovers. However,
the e↵ect would be smaller than in the previous case.
Moreover, the sign also depends on the change in the equilibrium quantities of
intermediates used. In this case, it is possible to assume that the equilibrium quantity
of domestic intermediates decreases with stronger IPR while the quantity of foreign
intermediates increases.
To determine the sign of the LHS of (4), note that
sign
✓
d(⇡F   ⇡L)
dk
◆
=sign
✓
d((m(k) + r) F (k) + i F (k))
dk
◆
(5)
Note that the RHS of (4) can be decomposed into the e↵ect on the slope and the e↵ect
on the intercept. The e↵ect on the slope is clear:
id F (k)
dk
=i
✓
dcF
dk
  dcL
dk
◆
> 0
Thus, an increase in IPR would unambiguously increase the slope of line L0 depicted
in figure 2, say, to that shown in line L1. When examining the e↵ect on the intercept,
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we need to consider two cases. It is possible that the decline in costs is dominated by
the reduction in imitation:
d((m+ r) F )
dk
=
dm
dk
+ (m+ r)
d F
dk
< 0
As noted in Maskus et al. (2005), in this case, the indi↵erence line between FDI and
licensing would shift downward and would also be steeper. Thus, the new line lies below
the old line for low rates of innovation (low-tech industries) and above the line for high
rates of innovation (high-tech industries). The result is that increasing IPR converts
licensing to FDI for low innovation rates but shifts FDI to licensing for high innovation
rates (line L1 in figure 2).
In the second case, it is possible that the decline in relative costs dominates the
reduction in imitation:
d((m+ r) F )
dk
>0
Here, the line shifts up and is steeper (line L2 in figure 2). Therefore, increasing IPR
unambiguously induces firms to increase licensing, regardless of the rate of innovation.
Therefore, there will be two hypotheses to be tested regarding the impacts of an
increase in IPR. The first is the e↵ect on backward spillovers to domestic firms through
licensing, and the second is that the magnitude of spillovers can depend on a firm’s
productivity.
Initially, licensing implies greater demand for domestic intermediate inputs, which
should result in higher productivity. However, as a result of stronger IPR, there should
be a decrease in backward spillovers.
IV. Data
As previously stated, the firm-level data used in this series of studies come from the
Chilean Encuesta Nacional Industrial Anual (ENIA).6 The survey is conducted by the
Chilean National Statistics Institute (INE) and covers all establishments (plants) with
ten or more workers. The years covered by this study are 2001–2007.
The unit of observation is the “establishment” (plant). There are firms that only
have one plant; however, there are firms that have more than one plant and that are in-
tegrated either vertically or horizontally (multi-plant and multi-activity). In the case of
multiple plants that belong to a firm, the survey includes each of these plants. Although
each plant has its own identification number (ID), due to statistical confidentiality pur-
poses, it is not possible to identify which plants belong to a given firm.7 Thus, each
6 This is a national survey of the manufacturing sector.
7This could present a problem if the majority of firms are multi-plant; however, as noted by Pavcnik
(2002), using a previous version of this dataset, approximately 90% of the firms have a single plant.
For the 2001-–2007 period, this figure is approximately 89%.
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plant has a unique ID number that allows one to follow its performance over time, thus
permitting longitudinal studies. In the present paper, the terms plant and firm will
be used interchangeably. However, we will generally refer to establishments as firms.
Regarding the activity of firms, to classify the economic activity of the plant, we use
the International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities (ISIC)
revision 3 from the United Nations classification system. The level of disaggregation
of economic activities is at the four-digit level8; however, due to data constraints, this
study focuses on two-digit aggregation.9
Data cleaning: The original dataset contains 37,307 firm-year observations, but
some observations were purged in the data cleaning process. First, firms with negative
value added have been purged from the study. Second, three di↵erent industries have
been excluded. Industry 27 at the two-digit level ISIC level (Manufacture of Basic
Metals) has been dropped from the study because the prices for these products are
guided mainly by international prices. This implies that such variables as value added
and sales for these products do not reflect the relationship between inputs and output.
Industries 30 and 32 (Manufacture of o ce, accounting and computing machinery and
Manufacture of radio, television and communication equipment, respectively) have been
dropped from the study since there are not enough observations in each case (11 and
51 for the entire sample, respectively) to have enough variation to properly estimate
productivity. To estimate TFP, the data have been grouped at the two-digit ISIC
level. To better understand the distribution of the data, please find the number of
observations and the description of each industry in table 11 in the Appendix. Note
that except for the Food and Beverages industry, the observations are fairly evenly
distributed. The rest of the observations that are purged are the firms that changed
either industries or regions (locations) during the period of the study. Although it
could be argued that there is a loss of information in this case, the counter-argument is
twofold. First, the number of observations lost is not large (approximately 6 percent of
the original dataset). Second, when estimating a model using fixed e↵ects, these fixed
e↵ects will capture all the inherited characteristics of a firm that do not change over
time. Thus, a change in industry or region would invalidate the interpretation of the
results. We deflate the entire dataset to reflect constant prices. The final dataset has
33,538 firm-year observations in 17 industries at the two-digit level.
IV.I Descriptive statistics
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics of key variables. It is important to note the high
heterogeneity among the firms in the dataset. On the one hand, there are firms with
8See http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cr/registry/regcst.asp?cl=2 for further details.
9The covered industries are, in terms of ISIC (Rev.3) codes, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 25, 26, 27,
28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, and 36. The ISIC (Rev.3) codes of the manufacturing sector range from
15 to 36. Industries 16 (tobacco) and 23 (coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel) have no
observations in the dataset.
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capital stock equal to zero, while other firms’ capital stock reaches 953,000 million
pesos. In addition, most of the stock of capital is held by domestic firms, and value
added reaches, on average, 2,342 million pesos with a standard deviation of 19,274.10.
To determine which firms are considered foreign, we used a 10-percent capital rule (i.e.,
if the capital holding is more than 10 percent, the establishment is considered foreign).
Nearly 94 percent of the firms are domestic, and only approximately 6 percent are
foreign. We observe a similar result when we examine the structure of firms that pay
licenses: 95 percent of firms do not pay licenses, while 5 percent do.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Key Variables
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Capital Stock 1,946 15,532.6 0 953,000
% Domestic Capital 96 19.3 0 100
% Foreign Capital 4 19.3 0 100
Value Added 2,342 19,274.8 0 1,720,000
Sales of Production 3,815 29,328.1 0 1,770,000
Total Wages 375 2,148.9 0 275,000
Gross Production Value 5,449 46,237.2 2 3,480,000
Payments for Licenses and Foreign Assistance 8 151.3 0 11,864
Income due to Exports 1.090 8,654.9 0 401,000
Number of Skilled Workers 13 46.4 0 1,554
Skilled/Unskilled Workers Ratio 1 3.5 0 159
Skilled/Total Workers Ratio 0 0.3 0 1
Notes: 1) We use 33,538 Obs. 2) All monetary values are in millions of 2003 pesos.
Moreover, when analyzing the dynamics of the number of firms present in Chile,
one striking feature is depicted in figure 3, in which the decline in the number of firms
after 2005 is extreme, achieving levels in 2007 that were even lower than those in 2001.
This is not the case solely for domestic firms; it seems that FDI in the manufacturing
sector has declined steadily in recent years.
To better analyze the dynamics between firms that undertake licensing, it is possible
to construct transition tables between 2001 and 2007. ( table 2). In this case, it is
clear that the number of firms that do not pay licenses decreased slightly during this
period (again, this is most likely due to a decrease in the total number of firms in
2007). However, the number of firms that pay licenses increased. Again, note the slight
increase in the percentage of firms that pay licenses in period t + 1, rising from 4.4%
to 4.5%.
10The average exchange rate in 2003 was 691.54 pesos per US dollar.
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Figure 3: Number of Firms
(a) Total (b) Foreign
(c) Licensing
Table 2: Transition Matrix for 2001-–2007
2001-2007
Period t+1
No Licensing Licensing Exit Total
Period t
No Licensing 75.2% 1.5% 9.4% 86.0%
Licensing 1.4% 2.6% 0.4% 4.4%
Enter 9.2% 0.4% 0.0% 9.6%
Total 85.8% 4.5% 9.7% 100.0%
IV.II IPR Reforms and Measures
IPR reform in Chile: Since technology transfer can be a↵ected by the implementation
of intellectual property rights (IPR), it is helpful to understand the concept and the
reform that happened in Chile in 2005. Intellectual property, in a very broad sense,
is everything that is created by the human mind, such as inventions, branding, and
literary works. However, in Chile, the term intellectual property is related specifically
to one branch of intellectual property, which are copyright laws for authors 11.
11In Chile, IPR encompasses industrial property, including patents, commercial branding, origin
denominations (controlled by the National Institute of Industrial Property (INAPI)), and copyright
law, relating to artists, and performers regarding their work, recordings, radio and TV shows (controlled
by the O ce of Intellectual Property Right)
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In this paper, we will focus more on the role of INAPI since it is the “...technical
and legislative o ce in charge of the administration and attention of the services of
Industrial Property...” Thus, one of the principal roles of INAPI is to regulate the
registry of IP rights12. While there have been some laws on IP dating back to the
Chilean constitution, Law No. 19,996 of March 11, 2005, was a comprehensive law
that made significant changes to the concept of brands, the process of requirements for
securing patents, brand registration, and the time limit for patents (set to 20 years). It
also included new fees to be paid for patenting and branding. Moreover, one of the most
important changes in the law was the creation of an Industrial Property Tribunal (Art.
17 of Law 19,996). This is an independent special court, subject to the Supreme Court,
which sits in the city of Santiago and has power over IPR-related disputes. All these
changes increased IPR in Chile, increased the enforcement of IP laws and reduced the
contracting costs related to technology transfer. Moreover, the increase in the number
of years allowed for a patent created an incentive to increase technology transfer to
Chile.
Measures of IPR: Given the above and the characteristics of the available data,
two di↵erent measures of IPR are used, a dummy variable at the time of the change
and the Fraser index. The dummy variable takes a value of one in and after the year
of the reform (2005) and a value of zero otherwise. This is the type of measure used by
Branstetter et al. (2007).
However, since such change cannot happen overnight, it is also useful to take into
account a measure that comes from a survey and relates to intellectual property rights
and property rights in general. Thus, the second measure of protection comes from
the Fraser Institute, in the Economic Freedom of the World report. In this case, the
question asked is whether “Property rights, including over financial assets are poorly
defined and not protected by law (= 0) or are clearly defined and well protected by law
(= 10)13”.
Note that the Fraser Institute measure of IPR, as the survey indicates, includes
a wider measure of property rights, not only including a specific intellectual property
rights measure but also a more general property rights measure, which also includes
assets.
The two di↵erent measures can be viewed in figure 4; note that the Fraser and
dummy measures follow the same trend, and thus, we should not expect di↵erences
between the results obtained when using either of them.
12For further information, see Instituto Nacional de Propiedad Industrial (www.inapi.cl).
13The formula used by the Fraser institute is based in the index presented by another institution,
the World Economic Forum, in its Global Competitiveness Report. The formula used is EFWi =
[(GCRi  1)/6] ⇤ 10.
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Figure 4: IPR Strength Measures
V. Empirical Approach
As presented in our theoretical framework, there can be spillover e↵ects derived from
licensing that a↵ect productivity and can be enhanced (or reduced) by strengthening (or
relaxing) IPR. Thus, the aim of our empirical strategy is to disentangle those e↵ects.
The first step is to estimate total factor productivity (TFP) to evaluate changes in
productivity due to licensing. To measure TFP, it is possible to employ the semi-
parametric method proposed by Olley and Pakes (1996), as used in Damijan et al.
(2008). Since the data contain many zeros for investment, the modification proposed by
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) should be employed to overcome the investment problem
and to correct for the bias that is created.14
Nevertheless, a new development in TFP estimation is proposed by Ackerberg et al.
(2006). They show that there is a collinearity problem when using either of the meth-
ods described above. Therefore, in this study, we will use their proposed method of
estimation and perform robustness checks with the previous estimation methods.
V.I Spillover E↵ects
As stated above, our spirit is very close to that of Lopez (2008) and Damijan et al.
(2008). To estimate the e↵ect of licensing on productivity through spillovers, we use a
slight modification of Lopez (2008):
log(TFPijrt) = ↵ +  
0Vjt +  0Xijrt +⇥0Zjt + "ijrt (6)
Where i is the plant, j is the sector, r is the region and t is the year. Vjt is a
14 This refers to the simultaneity bias that arises because not all inputs are exogenous to a firm’s
productivity. For a more detailed explanation, see Appendix C.
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vector that comes in three forms: it measures spillovers through the same industry
(horizontal linkages - Hjt); spillovers through backward linkages (Bjt); and spillovers
through forward linkages (Fjt). Xijrt is a vector of firm-level controls (exporter, foreign
owned). Finally, Zjt is a vector of control variables that includes the Herfindahl index
to control for concentration, the export to sales ratio of the sector and measures of
foreign presence in the same industry, as well in downstream industries and upstream
industries.
If we rewrite the full specification of this equation, we have
log(TFPijrt) =↵0 + ↵j + ↵r + ↵t +  1Hjt +  2Bjt +  3Fjt
+  1Mijrt +  2Oijrt
+ ✓1FDISjt + ✓2FDIDjt + ✓3FDIUjt
+ ✓4Herfjt + ✓5Expjt + "ijrt
(7)
Where ↵j is a set of industry dummies; ↵r is a set of region dummies; ↵t is a set of
time dummies; Hjt are horizontal spillovers; Bjt are backward spillovers; Fjt are forward
spillovers; Mijrt is the market presence of the firm (domestic, exporter, or both); Oijrt
is the ownership of the firm; FDISjt is FDI in the same industry; FDIDjt is FDI in
downstream industries; FDIUjt is FDI in upstream industries; Herfjt is the Herfindahl
Index; and Expjt is the exports to sales ratio by industry.
Moreover, if we want to include the e↵ect of the IPR reform, the full specification
becomes
log(TFPijrt) =↵0 + ↵j + ↵r + ↵t +  1Hjt +  2Bjt +  3Fjt
+  4Hjt ⇥ IPRt +  5Bjt ⇥ IPRt +  6Fjt ⇥ IPRt
+  1Mijrt +  2Oijrt
+ ✓1FDISjt + ✓2FDIDjt + ✓3FDIUjt
+ ✓4Herfjt + ✓5Expjt + "ijrt
(8)
The measurement of each of these variables entails considerable detail. To calculate
the vector Vjt, we use the value paid by each firm for licenses and technical assistance
to calculate these variables.15 The variable is calculated as follows:
Hjt =
P
i2j LijtP
i2j Salesijt
(9)
Where the assumption is that the larger the share of license payments is, the larger
15 For this variable, Lopez (2008) uses two methods, the stock method and the flow method. The
method described here refers to the flow method. For a detailed explanation of both methods, see
Lopez (2008).
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the potential spillover e↵ect. The backward spillover and forward spillover variables are
calculated as follows:
Bjt =
X
k,k 6=j
↵jkHkt (10)
Fjt =
X
k,k 6=j
 jkHkt (11)
Where ↵jk is the proportion of sector j’s output supplied to sector k, while  jk is the
share of inputs purchased by sector j from sector k.
Finally, the vector Zjt includes measurements of foreign presence:
FDI Same Sectorjt =
P
i2j Foreign Shareijt⇤YijtP
i2j Yijt
FDI Downstream Sectorjt =
X
k,k 6=j
↵jk⇤FDI Same Sectorkt
FDI Upstream Sectorjt =
X
k,k 6=j
 jk⇤FDI Same Sectorkt
Here, Foreign Shareijt is the percentage of foreign ownership, and Yijt is the output
(value added) of plant i, in industry j, and year t. The results obtained by Lopez (2008)
are reported in the Appendix. He reports that licensing to upstream sectors increases
the productivity of plants that purchase intermediate inputs from them (downstream
sectors); however, as explained above, licensing to downstream sectors generates a
negative e↵ect on the productivity of suppliers (upstream sectors). The latter result
goes against previous results, such as those in Javorcik (2004a) and Blalock and Gertler
(2008). This is another reason that it is important to validate the results. Moreover, it
is key to take into account the strengthening of IPR that occurred in 2005.
VI. Econometric issues
After estimating TFP, as noted by Javorcik (2004a) and Lopez (2008), there are a few
econometric issues that have to be taken into account when estimating equation (6).
First, there could be firm-level time-invariant characteristics that are not captured by
the model and make some firms more productive (the most widely used example is
managerial ability). Thus, it is necessary to estimate the equation in first di↵erences.
The resulting equation is equation (12).
 log(TFPijrt) =↵1 +  
0 Vjt +  0 Xijrt +⇥0 Zjt + "ijrt (12)
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In the full specification, this translates to
 log(TFPijrt) =↵1 +  1 Hjt +  2 Bjt +  3 Fjt +  4 (Hjt ⇥ IPRt)
+  5 (Bjt ⇥ IPRt) +  6 (Fjt ⇥ IPRt) +  1 Mijrt
+  2 Oijrt + ✓1 FDISjt + ✓2 FDIDjt
+ ✓3 FDIUjt + ✓4 Herfjt + ✓5 Expjt + "ijrt
(13)
The second issue is that there could be shocks at the industry or region level that
a↵ect the productivity of only one group of firms; therefore, it is necessary to include a
set of two-digit ISIC sector and region dummies, as well as a set of time dummies.16
The third issue is simultaneity (more productive sectors could spend more on licens-
ing). Thus, the entire vector Vjt in equation (12) could be correlated with the error
term. As discussed in Lopez (2008), this can be accounted for by using instrumen-
tal variables. To overcome this problem, the three licensing variables are instrumented
with their second and third lags. This is also an important di↵erence with Lopez (2008)
since the first lag of the licensing variables is not a valid instrument due to the model
being estimated in first di↵erences.17
The final issue is that we have to correct the standard errors because of the possi-
bility of underestimating them because our estimation uses firm-level data but includes
variables that vary by sector, as shown by Moulton (1990). In this case, we have to
cluster the standard errors at the industry-year level.
It is important to note that there are crucial di↵erences in the estimation relative
to Lopez (2008). First, the estimation of productivity is done for each two-digit in-
dustry instead of each three-digit industry. Second, the input-output table used in the
calculation of the backward and forward coe cients is the 2003 input-output table.
VII. Identification
The first step in identifying the model was taken by checking the underidentification
test and the overidentification test for the main three estimations of equation (13).
Another important aspect to check is the first stage of the three main estimations.
The summary results for the first-stage regressions are presented in tables 3, 4, and 5.
16 Importantly, note that due to econometric constraints, it is not possible to include this many
dummies while simultaneously calculating the standard errors using clustering at the industry-year
level; thus, one way to overcome this issue is to drop all firms that changed either region or industry,
as explained previously.
17 For a more detailed discussion see Cameron and Trivedi (2005) p.754.
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Table 3: First-Stage Results No IPR Measure
Summary results for first-stage regressions
Variable Shea Partial R2 Partial R2 F(6, 50) P-value
Horizontal Spillovers 0.4617 0.4533 22.47 0.0000
Backward Spillovers 0.4163 0.301 12.82 0.0000
Forward Spillovers 0.3263 0.3511 21.89 0.0000
Table 4: First-Stage Results Fraser IPR Measure
Summary results for first-stage regressions
Variable Shea Partial R2 Partial R2 F(12, 50) P-value
Horizontal Spillovers 0.7079 0.5639 27.68 0.0000
Backward Spillovers 0.8040 0.4627 16.78 0.0000
Forward Spillovers 0.7016 0.4392 31.87 0.0000
IPR Fraser x Horizontal Spillovers 0.9190 0.5524 25.53 0.0000
IPR Fraser x Backward Spillovers 0.9320 0.4536 21.84 0.0000
IPR Fraser x Forward Spillovers 0.9025 0.4204 20.62 0.0000
Table 5: First-Stage Results Dummy IPR Measure
Summary results for first-stage regressions
Variable Shea Partial R2 Partial R2 F(12, 50) P-value
Horizontal Spillovers 0.5520 0.5707 26.25 0.0000
Backward Spillovers 0.6540 0.4655 15.66 0.0000
Forward Spillovers 0.5005 0.4484 32.69 0.0000
Dummy IPR x Horizontal Spillovers 0.9250 0.6726 61.61 0.0000
Dummy IPR x Backward Spillovers 0.9314 0.6144 72.69 0.0000
Dummy IPR x Forward Spillovers 0.8982 0.6072 31.86 0.0000
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Several results are presented in the above tables: Shea’s partial R-squared, which
takes into account the correlation between instruments; the regular R-squared between
the instruments and the endogenous regressors; and the F test of the excluded instru-
ments in the corresponding first-stage regression.
The “rule of thumb” is that the F test should be greater than 10 if the instruments
are “strong.”18 This is the case in all the first-stage regressions in this study, which
is a very reassuring result when considering the number of instruments needed in each
regression. Since all the first-stage regressions seem to work reasonably well, it is
possible to consider the second-stage estimation as in the previous section.
VIII. Results
In the estimated model for equation (13), for each case (no IPR measure, Fraser mea-
sure, and dummy variable measure), there are four estimation methods. The first
method uses Ordinary Least Squares –OLS– over the entire sample (Pooled OLS). The
second method takes into account the firm-level time-invariant characteristics and is es-
timated using OLS in first di↵erences (OLS FD). The third method takes into account
the simultaneity problem, using Instrumental Variables (IV) to estimate the coe cients
(Panel IV).The last method takes into account all the di↵erent issues and estimates the
model using instrumental variables in first di↵erences (Panel IV FD). Since the Panel
IV in first di↵erences estimation is the appropriate estimation method, its results are
those provided in this paper 19.
Moreover, note that in every specification of the model without the IPR reform, the
sample is reduced because if we use the entire sample, it would be misspecified since
there was an IPR reform in 2005. The results are presented in Table 6.
For the estimation without the IPR change, if the estimation is performed using the
entire sample, this would cause a misspecification issue, as we know that there was a
change in 2005. Therefore, the estimation is done using only the 2001-–2004 period.
One di↵erence with the results obtained by Lopez (2008) is that there is strong positive
evidence of backward spillovers, while he finds a negative e↵ect.
This is a very interesting result that can be explained by the fact that these spillovers
could be thought of as promoting the use of domestic inputs, which in turn would result
in technology transfer to upstream sectors. Moreover, the results show no significant
forward spillovers.
These results are in line with Javorcik (2004a) in the sense of foreign presence having
the same e↵ect on domestic firms. There might be a few reasons for this finding. First,
Chile has been developing quite rapidly in the past decade, which would change its
productive sector (captured by the IO table). Since in the period considered, Chile is
18 This was motivated initially by Staiger and Stock (1997) and updated by Stock and Yogo (2002).
19The other estimation methods have been calculated and are available from the author upon request.
20
Table 6: Spillover E↵ects Under Di↵erent IPR Measures (Panel IV in First Di↵erences)
Dependent variable: Iog (TFP) No IPR Fraser IPR Dummy IPR
Horizontal Spillovers -1.57 0.05 -0.07
(1.37) (0.57) (0.28)
Backward Spillovers 4.85*** 2.66*** 1.20***
(1.13) (0.72) (0.46)
Forward Spillovers -0.70 -1.33 -0.19
(2.24) (0.81) (0.48)
IPR Fraser -0.54**
(0.23)
IPR Fraser x Horizontal Spillovers -0.02
(0.07)
IPR Fraser x Backward Spillovers -0.31***
(0.10)
IPR Fraser x Forward Spillovers 0.23**
(0.09)
Dummy IPR 0.11***
(0.04)
Dummy IPR x Horizontal Spillovers -0.09
(0.21)
Dummy IPR x Backward Spillovers -0.87***
(0.29)
Dummy IPR x Forward Spillovers 0.71**
(0.28)
Kleibergen-Paap LM Statistic (under-identification test) 0.00 0.00 0.00
Hansen J Statistic (over-identification test) 0.26 0.38 0.40
Observations 2,884 8,932 8,932
Time, Industry and Region Dummies YES YES YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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similar to Lithuania as studied in Javorcik (2004a), it would seem plausible to infer
that a country’s degree of development plays a crucial role in di↵erent spillover e↵ects,
especially inter-industry spillovers.
Second, the development of the Chilean economy entails an increase in the imita-
tive/absorptive capacity of domestic firms. Thus, if there is “new” technology in the
market, it is easier for a more-developed nation to start imitating products that are
either coming straight from MNEs through FDI or indirectly through licensing. It is
important to note that if there is a high degree of imitation in the host country, then
that would create a positive bias in the spillover e↵ect since the spillover e↵ect would
not exclusively capture spillover e↵ects through any type of learning from foreign tech-
nology (i.e., learning from exporting), and this would result in an overestimation of the
spillover e↵ects20.
Regarding the e↵ect of stronger IPR, the results in table 6 show that when using
the Fraser IPR measure and the dummy IPR measure, backward spillovers are smaller
after the reform21.
When comparing the results once the IPR measure is introduced, it is important to
note that before the policy change, the increase in productivity was between 2.7% and
1.2%. In the case of the estimation using the Fraser Institute IPR measure, the decline
in backward spillovers is approximately 0.3%. When using the dummy variable, this
decline is much higher (0.9%).
Finally, it is important to note that all the tables containing results include the
probabilities of rejection (p-values) of two important tests: the Kleibergen-Paap LM
statistic, which tests for underidentification with the null hypothesis being that the
model is not identified. The second test is the Hansen J statistic for overidentification,
with the null hypothesis being that the instruments are valid.
Therefore, it is possible to infer that introducing an IPR measure had a negative
e↵ect on backward linkages. Furthermore, there is a positive e↵ect of the policy reform
on forward linkages.
The first result can be explained by regarding stronger IPR as stronger punishments
in some sense and that they will deter firms from passing along new technology into
backward industries. The second result can be explained in the case in which the market
is fairly competitive, as this would mean that introducing stronger IPR measures would
induce larger forward linkages, which could be due to lower prices for downstream
industries.
20Here, the assumption is that this imitative capacity is not high enough to create bias, but this
could be checked by introducing an interaction term of the spillover e↵ects with skilled labor, as in
Damijan et al. (2008).
21To make this claim, it is useful to consider the dummy IPR measure and the Fraser measure as
interaction terms that reflect the di↵erence between before and after the reform. However, this is not
a di↵erence- in-di↵erence estimation since the change in IPR a↵ects each firm in the same way.
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Note that this positive e↵ect of the reform on forward spillovers is a very interesting
result. In both cases, for the Fraser Institute measure and the dummy variable, this
term is positive and significant. This represents the fact that although firms did not
initially face forward spillover e↵ects, after the IPR reform, they tend to induce higher
productivity in downstream industries. One example of this could be any intermediate
goods industry that after the IPR reform had a large “market e↵ect” and thus increased
production, and this would decrease the price for inputs in downstream industries.
Again, in this case, the e↵ect is much stronger under the dummy variable than under
the Fraser Institute measure.
IX. Extensions
IX.I Productivity heterogeneity
As Damijan et al. (2008) show, the magnitude of backward spillovers can depend on the
productivity of the firm. Thus, since the backward linkage e↵ects of licenses have been
established, it is possible to analyze the same e↵ects depending on the productivity
of the firm. Following Damijan et al. (2008), it is possible to divide the sample into
di↵erent quartiles of productivity and estimate equation (13).22
It is important to make this distinction, not only to analyze the e↵ect of firm
characteristics on the spillover results, as explained by Damijan et al. (2008), but also
because it is important to observe the e↵ect of a change in the IPR regime and its e↵ect
on firms with di↵erent productivity levels.
The results for the model without any IPR e↵ects are reported in table 7. In all
cases, the estimation was performed using Panel IV in first di↵erences. In this case,
when examining the results by quartile, it is possible to see that there are significant
backward linkages for firms in the lower quartiles but not for high-productivity firms.
One reason for this may be that low-productivity firms have room to benefit from new
technology, while high-productivity firms already have “high-end” technology and do
not benefit from spillover e↵ects.
The next question is what happens when there is a change in IPR. table 8 depicts
the results by quartile when using the Fraser IPR measure and confirms the results
above in the sense that lower-productivity firms benefit more than high-productivity
firms. Thus, there seems to be stronger backward linkages for low-productivity firms.
The interaction term is negative for all quartiles and significant for all the quartiles
except the third. Moreover, the firms that are most a↵ected by the introduction of the
IPR reform are again the least-productive firms. This is consistent with the results pre-
sented in the previous table, as it seems that low-productivity firms are highly a↵ected
22 It is important to note that the decision to split the sample into quartiles makes it possible to
estimate the model. If the division were into smaller bins, there would not be enough observations in
each group for the estimation.
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by the IPR reform. Thus, this indicates that the IPR reform imposed a restriction on
low-productivity firms to enable an increase in their productivity. The results using the
dummy IPR measure are depicted in table 9. These results are in line with the main
result of positive backward linkages and a negative e↵ect of the IPR reform.
Another important result when analyzing productivity quartiles is that there is
evidence of negative forward linkages for low-productivity firms, which was not present
in the result for the entire sample. These negative forward linkages for low-productivity
firms could be explained by the fact that, as those firms do not possess “high-end”
technology, it might be the case that they are not able to fully reap the benefits of new
inputs.
Table 7: Spillover E↵ects by TFP Quartile with no IPR Measure
Dependent variable: log (TFP) Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4
Horizontal Spillovers 5.71 3.04 -5.22* -0.71
(8.00) (4.30) (2.68) (4.99)
Backward Spillovers 19.50* 11.16** 10.84 10.04
(10.16) (5.48) (6.76) (15.60)
Forward Spillovers -17.78 -11.39* 3.02 -5.10
(12.30) (6.51) (4.32) (6.25)
Foreign Ownership -0.08 -0.04 -0.20** 0.22
(0.49) (0.08) (0.09) (0.28)
Market presence -0.00 -0.17** -0.05 -0.07
(0.27) (0.07) (0.05) (0.12)
Kleibergen-Paap LM Statistic 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(under-identification test)
Hansen J Statistic (over-identification test) n/a n/a n/a n/a
Observations 797 828 851 876
Time, Industry and Region Dummies YES YES YES YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
In this case, the interaction term is positive, which would indicate that stronger
IPR benefit firms. As explained previously, this could be the case when the market is
competitive. Thus, this increase in productivity may be reflected in lower prices for
downstream industries. Similar results are obtained when analyzing the dummy IPR
measure.
IX.II Size heterogeneity
Damijan et al. (2008) also demonstrate the importance of firm size in determining
the magnitude of spillover e↵ects. Thus, it is also possible to analyze spillover e↵ects
depending on the size of the firm through the estimation of equation (13) by quartile
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Table 8: Spillover E↵ects by TFP Quartile with Fraser IPR Measure
Dependent variable: log (TFP) Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4
Horizontal Spillovers 3.71* 1.20 1.02 -1.93***
(2.10) (1.20) (0.79) (0.52)
Backward Spillovers 11.20*** 6.46*** 0.74 5.91***
(3.81) (2.08) (1.36) (1.17)
Forward Spillovers -10.85*** -4.68*** -1.96* -0.54
(2.55) (1.75) (1.12) (1.15)
FDI same sector 0.03 -0.02* 0.01 0.01
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
FDI downstream sectors 0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.00
(0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
FDI upstream sectors -0.04 0.01 -0.00 -0.02*
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
IPR Fraser -1.20 -0.48 -0.19 -1.26*
(0.92) (0.42) (0.42) (0.66)
IPR Fraser x Horizontal Spillovers -0.24 0.07 -0.13 0.21***
(0.23) (0.12) (0.08) (0.05)
IPR Fraser x Backward Spillovers -1.41** -0.79** -0.13 -0.63***
(0.56) (0.31) (0.17) (0.14)
IPR Fraser x Forward Spillovers 1.15*** 0.19 0.26** 0.35***
(0.22) (0.16) (0.12) (0.13)
Foreign Ownership -0.04 0.07 0.12 0.04
(0.19) (0.10) (0.18) (0.06)
Market presence -0.43** -0.14** 0.07 -0.03
(0.17) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05)
Kleibergen-Paap P-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Hansen J Statistic P-value 0.12 0.41 0.81 0.76
Observations 1,818 2,240 2,355 2,519
Time, Industry and Region Dummies YES YES YES YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 9: Spillover E↵ects by TFP Quartile with Dummy IPR Measure
Dependent variable: log (TF’P) Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4
Horizontal Spillovers 2.62* 1.54* 0.48 -0.95***
(1.37) (0.82) (0.50) (0.36)
Backward Spillovers 4.52** 2.79*** -0.02 3.10**
(1.94) (0.94) (0.98) (1.23)
Forward Spillovers -5.35*** -3.73*** -0.81 0.98
(1.90) (1.20) (0.76) (1.30)
FDI same sector 0.03 -0.02* 0.01 0.01
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
FDI downstream sectors 0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.00
(0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
FDI upstream sectors -0.04 0.01 -0.00 -0.02*
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Dummy IPR 0.19 0.20*** 0.11 0.12
(0.16) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09)
Dummy IPR x Horizontal Spillovers -0.76 0.17 -0.42* 0.62***
(0.63) (0.33) (0.24) (0.15)
Dummy IPR x Backward Spillovers -4.07*** -2.23** -0.37 -1.88***
(1.57) (0.89) (0.49) (0.40)
Dummy IPR x Forward Spillovers 3.35*** 0.59 0.83** 1.03***
(0.60) (0.47) (0.34) (0.36)
Foreign Ownership -0.03 0.07 0.13 0.04
(0.18) (0.10) (0.18) (0.06)
Market presence -0.44** -0.14* 0.06 -0.03
(0.17) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05)
Kleibergen-Paap P-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Hansen J Statistic P-value 0.12 0.50 0.81 0.76
Observations 1,818 2,240 2,355 2,519
R-squared 0.03 0.02 0.01 -0.01
Time, Industry and Region Dummies YES YES YES YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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depending on firm size, as measured by the total number of workers. The results
obtained in this estimation are very close to the productivity results in the previous
section. The results for the model without any IPR e↵ects are reported in table ??.
Table ?? depicts the results by quartile when using the Fraser IPR measure. Here,
we observe a very interesting trend regarding spillovers from downstream sectors. In
this case, similar to productivity, all the smaller firms seem to “benefit” more from
backward linkages before the strengthening of IPR. Furthermore, the interaction term
is negative for all quartiles.
The results using the dummy IPR measure are depicted in table ??. These results
are in line with the main result of positive backward linkages, mainly in smaller firms.
IX.III Issues with firms exiting the market
As depicted in figure 3, there has been a clear decline in the number of firms in the man-
ufacturing sector in Chile since 2005. The change in the number of firms could be due to
a number of reasons, such as i) changes in how firms report their status (transitioning
from manufacturing to service industries, for example); ii) mergers and acquisitions;
and iii) decline in certain activities such as textiles and shoe manufacturing, among
others.
One main concern might be that this decline is driving the results. To determine
whether this is the case, it is possible to perform the analysis while restricting the sample
to a balanced panel; in so doing, we would be considering only firms that remained in
the market for the entire period.
The results are depicted in table 10 and confirm the previous results. Note that
the decline in the total number of manufacturing firms is not a↵ecting the results.
Therefore, when considering only a balanced panel, we obtain the same qualitative
results as in table 6.
IX.IV Specification Issues
Since equation equation (13) has three di↵erent terms that are derived essentially from
the horizontal linkages equation, equation (9), where Hjt depends on the level of licenses
paid in one industry, it is conceivable that there is a high correlation between this
variable and the backward spillover e↵ects variable Bjt and the forward spillover e↵ects
variable Fjt.23
To ensure that this plausible correlation does not a↵ect the results, four di↵erent
specifications will be tested: one in which there is no foreign presence; one in which there
are no horizontal spillover e↵ects; one in which there is no foreign presence or horizontal
23 Recall from equations equation (10) and (11) that these two variables are Hjt relative to the IO
table.
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Table 10: Spillover E↵ects Under Di↵erent IPR Measures
(Balanced Panel IV in First Di↵erences)
Dependent variable: log (TPF) No IPR Fraser IPR Dummy IPR
Horizontal Spillovers -3.14*** 0.20 0.12
(1.13) (0.67) (0.33)
Backward Spillovers 6.12*** 2.28*** 0.93*
(1.58) (0.85) (0.51)
Forward Spillovers 0.41 -1.89** -0.70
(1.62) (0.91) (0.52)
IPR Fraser -0.48*
(0.27)
IPR Fraser x Horizontal Spillovers -0.02
(0.09)
IPR Fraser x Backward Spillovers -0.29**
(0.12)
IPR Fraser x Forward Spillovers 0.25**
(0.11)
Dummy IPR 0.14***
(0.04)
Dummy IPR x Horizontal Spillovers -0.07
(0.25)
Dummy IPR x Backward Spillovers -0.82**
(0.36)
Dummy PR x Forward Spillovers 0.74**
(0.31)
Kleibergen-Paap P-value 0.00 0.00 0.00
Hansen J Statistic P-value 0.11 0.28 0.28
Observations 2,409 7,227 7,227
Time, Industry and Region Dummies YES YES YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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spillover e↵ects; and finally one in which there is a di↵erent use of instrumental variables.
All the results are depicted in the Appendix. Recall that the original specification was
 log(TFPijrt) =↵1 +  1 Hjt +  2 Bjt +  3 Fjt +  4 (Hjt ⇥ IPRt)
+  5 (Bjt ⇥ IPRt) +  6 (Fjt ⇥ IPRt) +  1 Mijrt
+  2 Oijrt + ✓1 FDISjt + ✓2 FDIDjt
+ ✓3 FDIUjt + ✓4 Herfjt + ✓5 Expjt + "ijrt
Where Hjt are horizontal spillovers; Bjt are backward spillovers; Fjt are forward
spillovers; Mijrt is the market presence of the firm (domestic, exporter, or both); Oijrt
is the ownership of the firm; FDISjt is FDI in the same industry; FDIDjt is FDI in
downstream industries; FDIUjt is FDI in upstream industries; Herfjt is the Herfindahl
index; and Expjt is the exports-to-sales ratio by industry.
IX.IV.1 No foreign presence
In this case, equation (13) is replaced by
 log(TFPijrt) =↵1 +  1 Hjt +  2 Bjt +  3 Fjt +  4 (Hjt ⇥ IPRt)
+  5 (Bjt ⇥ IPRt) +  6 (Fjt ⇥ IPRt) +  1 Mijrt
+  2 Oijrt + ✓4 Herfjt + ✓5 Expjt + "ijrt
(14)
Table 6 reports the results for the unbalanced panel. When examining these re-
sults, positive backward spillovers are confirmed. Moreover, the IPR reform exhibits a
negative impact on those spillovers.
Moreover, when using a balanced panel in this case, as depicted in table 15 in the
Appendix, the results regarding the IPR reform are confirmed. However, the coe cient
on backward spillovers tends to be non significant, but still positive.
IX.IV.2 No horizontal spillover e↵ects
In this case, equation (13) is replaced by
 log(TFPijrt) =↵1 +  2 Bjt +  3 Fjt +  5 (Bjt ⇥ IPRt) +  6 (Fjt ⇥ IPRt)
+  1 Mijrt +  2 Oijrt + ✓1 FDISjt + ✓2 FDIDjt
+ ✓3 FDIUjt + ✓4 Herfjt + ✓5 Expjt + "ijrt
(15)
The results for the unbalanced panel are depicted in table 17. When analyzing these
results, positive backward spillovers remain, and the IPR reform had a negative e↵ect
on those spillovers.
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Note that there seems to be a negative forward spillover e↵ect, which was not present
before. Furthermore, there is evidence of a positive e↵ect of the IPR reform on forward
spillovers. When using a balanced panel, as depicted in table 17, the results regarding
the IPR reform are confirmed.
IX.IV.3 No foreign presence or horizontal spillover e↵ects
In this case, equation (13) is replaced by
 log(TFPijrt) =↵1 +  2 Bjt +  3 Fjt +  5 (Bjt ⇥ IPRt) +  6 (Fjt ⇥ IPRt)
+  1 Mijrt +  2 Oijrt + ✓4 Herfjt + ✓5 Expjt + "ijrt
(16)
Table 15 displays results for the unbalanced panel. Positive backward spillovers are
still evident, and the IPR reform negatively a↵ects these spillovers.
Again, a negative forward spillover e↵ect, which was not present before, is now
evident. Furthermore, the IPR reform positively a↵ects forward spillovers. When using
a balanced panel, as depicted in table 19, the results regarding the IPR reform are
confirmed.
IX.IV.4 Di↵erent use of IV
Another check that we can perform is to use the following equation:
 log(TFPijrt) =↵1 +  2 Bjt +  3 Fjt +  5 (Bjt ⇥ IPRt) +  6 (Fjt ⇥ IPRt)
+  1 Mijrt +  2 Oijrt + ✓4 Herfjt + ✓5 Expjt + "ijrt
(17)
However, now there is a major di↵erence with the previous case since the horizontal
linkage variables are not used as instruments. The results for the unbalanced panel
are depicted in table 20. When analyzing these results, positive backward spillovers
remain, and the IPR reform had a negative e↵ect on those spillover e↵ects.
Again, note that there seems to be a negative forward spillover e↵ect, which was
not present before. Furthermore, there is evidence of a positive e↵ect of the IPR reform
on these spillovers. When using a balanced panel, as depicted in table 21, the results
regarding the IPR reform are confirmed.
X. Conclusions
The importance of technological transfer for economic growth has been emphasized
throughout the economics literature. Moreover, developing countries rely on licensing
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and FDI as sources of technology transfer and innovation. Thus, it is important to
clarify the most e↵ective channels through which a developing country can benefit from
technological advancements in developed countries.
Thus, this study sheds some light on the importance of licensing as a technology
di↵usion mechanism. Using a dataset that contains more than 33,000 firm-year ob-
servations, we provide empirical evidence of the existence of backward spillover e↵ects
from licensing in Chile during the 2001–2007 period.
Due to the implementation of reform that strengthened IPR in Chile in 2005, it is
possible to analyze the e↵ect that this change had on how technology di↵uses within
and across industries. To do so, we used two di↵erent measures of IPR, and we also
used the Chilean 2003 input-output table to capture the linkages between sectors.
The main contribution of this paper is to show how di↵erent economic policies
can a↵ect di↵erent sectors of the economy. In this case, it was possible to show that
increasing the strength of IPR leads to smaller backward linkages, reducing the spillover
e↵ects in the economy. With stricter and better-enforced laws, there are fewer incentives
for people to transfer technology when a penalty may be incurred.
Another contribution is to control for firm heterogeneity in productivity and in size
to analyze di↵erent e↵ects for di↵erent sub-samples of the survey. The results obtained,
at least with the full sample, provide evidence that low-productivity and smaller firms,
which formerly benefitted more from spillover e↵ects, now su↵er more from the change
in IPR policy. This is in line with the results obtained by Keller and Yeaple (2009).
The negative impact of stronger IPR in these cases is of greater magnitude than when
compared to mid- or high-productivity firms.
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Appendix
A. Descriptive statistics
Table 11: Distribution of Firms according to Sector
ISIC rev.3 at 2-digit level Observations Percent Description
15 10,764 32.09 Manufacture of food
products and beverages
17 1,656 4.94 Manufacture of textiles
18 1,773 5.29 Manufacture of wearing apparel;
dressing and dyeing of fur
19 883 2.63 Tanning and dressing of leather;
manufacture of luggage, handbags,
saddlery, harness and footwear
20 2,320 6.92 Manufacture of wood and of products
of wood and cork, except furniture;
manufacture of articles of straw
and plaiting materials
21 1,026 3.06 Manufacture of paper and paper products
22 1,716 5.12 Publishing, printing and reproduction
of recorded media
24 2,033 6.06 Manufacture of chemicals and
chemical products
25 2,144 6.39 Manufacture of rubber and
plastics products
26 1,816 5.41 Manufacture of other non-metallic
mineral products
28 2,473 7.37 Manufacture of fabricated metal
products, except machinery and equipment
29 1,844 5.5 Manufacture of machinery
and equipment n.e.c.
31 499 1.49 Manufacture of electrical machinery and
apparatus n.e.c.
33 205 0.61 Manufacture of medical, precision
and optical instruments, watches
and clocks
34 482 1.44 Manufacture of motor vehicles,
trailers and semi-trailers
35 296 0.88 Manufacture of other transport equipment
36 1,608 4.79 Manufacture of furniture;
manufacturing n.e.c.
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B. Spillovers: results from Lopez (2008).
Table 12: Productivity spillovers from foreign technology licensing
Licenses all plants-stock Licenses all plants-flow
OLS (1) FD (2) FD-IV (3) OLS (4) FD (5) FD-IV (6)
Licenses same sector (S) -0.119 -0.047 -0.035 0.005 -0.012 -0.022
(3.06)** (1.66)*** (0.79) (0.40) (0.95) (1.26)
Licenses downstream sectors (D) -0.133 -0.185 -0.228 0.002 -0.141 -0.248
(2.84)** (4.62)** (5.19)** (0.05) (4.65)** (5.92)**
Licenses upstream sectors (U) -0.035 0.578 0.764 -0.055 0.237 0.400
(0.53) (6.11)** (6.48)** (1.44) ( 5.63 )** (6.01)**
Herfindahl index -0.071 -0.277 -0.277 -0.130 -0.275 -0.277
(1.31) (6.01)** (6.13)** (2.28)* (5.50)** (5.64)**
FDI same sector 0.008 -0.003 -0.002 0.012 -0.005 -0.002
(1.60) (0.67) (0.33) (2.12)* (1.00) (0.43)
FDI downstream sectors 0.031 -0.015 0.024 0.030 -0.064 0.023
(0.78) (0.38) (0.59) (0.67) (2.20)* (0.58)
FDI upstream sectors 0.013 0.229 0.177 0.046 0.363 0.327
(0.34) (4.11)** (3.01)** (1.20) (6.64)** (5.46)**
Exports sector 0.032 -0.042 -0.015 -0.004 -0.075 -0.045
(1.07) (1.04) (0.33) (0.14) (2.01)* (1.09)
Exporter dummy 0.462 -0.013 -0.012 0.466 -0.017 -0.016
(16.43)** (0.77) (0.70) (16.51)** (0.98) (0.94)
Foreign ownership dummy 0.259 0.050 0.051 0.278 0.050 0.052
(9.50)** (1.28) (1.31) (9.97)** (1.27) (1.29)
Licenses/sales 1.613 1.345 1.346 3.866 0.494 0.465
(7.48)** (2.76)** (2.77)** (2.37)* (1.52) (1.41)
R-squared 0.517 0.098 0.096 0.515 0.087 0.079
Number of observations 33,821 26,740 26,740 33,821 26,740 26,740
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. **, *, ***: significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%. Three-digit
sector, region, and year dummy variables were included but not reported. Standard errors were
clustered at the sector-year level.
C. TFP estimation
Following Van Beveren (2012), the most common functional form for the output is to
assume a Cobb-Douglas production function. Thus, the estimating equation, would be:
Yijrt = AijrtK
 k
ijrt
Ls
 ls
ijrt
Lu
 lu
ijrt
(18)
Where Yijrt is output of the firm i in sector j and region r at time t; Kijrt is
the capital stock; while Ls and Lu are the number of skilled and unskilled workers
respectively. If we apply logarithms to this equation we get:
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yijrt =  0 +  kkijrt +  lsl
s
ijrt +  lul
u
ijrt + "ijrt (19)
So that productivity is:
ln TFPijrt = yijrt    kkijrt    lslsijrt    luluijrt (20)
Which can also be seen as:
ln Aijrt =  0 + "ijrt
It is important to note that "ijrt is the time-industry-region-producer specific pro-
ductivity shock, which can be decomposed into an observable part and an unobservable
component. Therefore we have:
ln Aijrt =  0 + ⌫ijrt + ⌘ijrt
So that productivity is !ijrt =  0 + ⌫ijrt and ⌘ijrt is an i.i.d. error component. It
is important to note that ⌫ijrt is a part of the error term that is observed by the firm
but not by the econometrician.
One might be tempted to estimate equation (19) using Ordinary Least Squares
(OLS). However, there are several methodological issues that have to be taken into
account to estimate equation (19). If we were to specify the issues one by one, we
would see possible solutions.
C.I Endogeneity
If we would estimate equation (19) using OLS, the main assumption would be that all
the inputs in the production function are exogenous. However, as noted by Marschak
and Andrews (1944) inputs in the production function are not chosen independently.
The clearest case is that any firm would determine their labor inputs according to its
productivity, and thus creating a correlation between the level of inputs chosen and the
productivity shock that is observed by the firm but not by the econometrician.
Thus, if the firm has knowledge of !ijrt, it would a↵ect the choice of inputs. If there
is a positive productivity shock, this would likely increase the use of variable inputs
(unskilled and skilled labor), which in turn would introduce an upward bias to the
estimates of variable input coe cients and a downward bias on fixed input coe cients
(capital).
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C.II Selection bias
The problem of selection bias is introduced when, in an unbalanced panel of firms, the
decision on allocation of inputs (especially variable inputs) is not independent of the
decision to continue operating in the market. Therefore, the estimation technique has
to take into account that the estimates are conditional on the survival of the firm.
There are many theoretical models that predict the importance of productivity on
the firm’s decision to continue operating in the market. Therefore, if firms have some
knowledge of their productivity, this would generate a negative bias on the capital stock
coe cient. This bias is due to the fact that firms with higher capital stock and a given
productivity are more likely to survive than firms with low capital stock and the same
productivity level.24
C.III Estimation
There have been many di↵erent ways to approach the problems outlined above. The
most important ways to estimate will be explained in turn. This part follows closely the
work of Van Biesebroeck (2003), Van Biesebroeck (2007), and Van Beveren (2012).25
In the following subsections we will use a typical Cobb-Douglas production function
so that there is only one type of labor (this is only a simplification that helps explain
the di↵erent methods of estimation). Thus, the production process is assumed to be:
Yit = AitK
 k
it
L
 l
it
(21)
C.III.1 Index numbers
This approach does not rely on a functional form of the production function. It relies
on a theoretical approach to estimate the relation between inputs and output without
the necessity to specify an exact production function. The basic idea of this approach
is to calculate the following formula:
log (Ait/Ait 1) = log (Yit/Yit 1)
  [sit log (Lit/Lit 1) + (1  sit) log (Kit/Kit 1)] (22)
Where sit is the average cost share of labor between time t and t  1.
24 Van Beveren (2012) also makes reference to problems related to omitted price bias and multi-
product firms. However, we will focus on the problems outlined here since they have been under study
for much longer and also because they are more relevant in this study.
25 In the following subsections, the production function will be indexed at the firm-time level instead
of being at the firm-industry-region-time level.
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One of the main advantages of using index numbers is that they are easy to calculate
while keeping the technology fairly flexible. Also, as long as there is some data regarding
the inputs, it is easy to modify equation (22) in order to include all the inputs.
The biggest drawback of this approach is that it is very sensitive to the quality of
the data and, most importantly, a number of assumptions have to be satisfied: constant
returns to scale, competitive input and output markets, and profit maximizing firms.
Next, there are some parametric methods that try to overcome the endogeneity and
selection bias. However, we will only explain the non-parametric approaches that have
been developed recently. For a more detailed explanation on the parametric approaches
see Van Biesebroeck (2003).
C.III.2 Olley and Pakes
Olley and Pakes (1996) (OP henceforth) constitutes a major breakthrough in productiv-
ity estimation since they take into account both the endogeneity issue and the selection
bias problem. As Ackerberg et al. (2006) (ACF henceforth) point out, the main assump-
tion is that capital is a fixed input that depends on an investment process. Therefore,
capital in period t depends on capital in t 1 and investment it 1. This timing helps to
solve the endogeneity issue with respect to capital since the decision of capital is taken
before the knowledge of the productivity shock.
Therefore, Olley and Pakes (1996) introduce a three-step estimation process where
the investment of the firm is a monotonically increasing function of productivity and
existing capital.
If the relationship is monotonically increasing, as explained in Arnold (2005), the
investment decision is a function of the productivity (!it) and the capital stock:26
iit = it(!it, kit)
This relation can be inverted and we have a function for productivity that depends on
investment and capital:
!it = ht(iit, kit)
Then the estimating equation becomes:
yit =  llit +  kkit + ht(iit, kit) + ⌘it
We can define the function:
26 For ease of exposition we will only include one variable that represents labor, although in this
study we use skilled and unskilled labor as two di↵erent inputs.
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!it =  kkit + ht(iit, kit)
Thus for the first step, the estimating equation becomes:
yit =  0 +  llit +  (iit, kit) + ⌘it
Since the functional form of  (.) is unknown, it can be approximated non-parametrically
by a third or fourth degree polynomial. Thus, in the first stage, both b l and b  can be
estimated using regular Ordinary Least Squares (OLS).
In the second step, they introduce a correction for the selection bias (exit decision).
Exit is conditional on the realization of productivity, with a given threshold for firms to
exit. Both are unknown functions of investment and capital, and they can be estimated
through a probit regression for exit. Thus, in the second step, the probability of survivalcPit is estimated.
Also, since b l has been consistently estimated in the first stage, then it is possible
to form a new function Vit = yit   b llit and estimate:
Vit =  kkit + g( it 1    kkit 1) + f( it 1    kkit 1)cPit + ⌘it (23)
Where g(.) and f(.) are unknown functions and are therefore estimated using a
polynomial approximation as in the first step. However, it is worth noting that in this
stage, since there is a given structure for  k, then this equation has to be estimated
using Non Linear Least Squares. Once we have estimates of equation (23) then we
obtain consistent estimates of  l and  k, enabling the construction of TFP.
However the main limitation of this methodology is that there could be a large
number of “zero” investment observations (not all firms invest every single period).
Thus a considerable amount of information is potentially lost.
C.III.3 Levinsohn and Petrin
Since Olley and Pakes (1996) assume that there is a monotonic relation between invest-
ment and productivity, then, in order to use that method it is necessary that all the
observations with zero investment are dropped from the sample.
As explained above, this could imply a significant loss of observations in the dataset
(depending on how many firms do not invest). Since investment is not always positive,
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) (LP henceforth) provide an alternative approach.
The estimation is very much in spirit of Olley and Pakes (1996). However, they use
intermediate inputs as a proxy for productivity shocks. As Arnold (2005) points out,
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typically there are significantly less zero- observations in intermediate inputs than in
investment.
C.III.4 Ackerberg, Caves, and Fraser
More recently, Ackerberg et al. (2006) have re-examined the estimation methods for
production functions. They shed some light into some issues that might hinder the
methodology proposed by Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003).
They argue that there may be significant problems with the estimation of produc-
tion functions if the methods mentioned above are used. The most critical issue are
collinearity problems that arise in both methods. If the assumptions of the OP and LP
methods hold, then it would be possible to identify  l in the following equation:27
yit =  llit +  kkit + ht(iit, kit) + ⌘it (24)
Where ht(iit, kit) is the productivity shock (!it) in the OP methodology. In the LP
methodology, it is replaced by ht(mit, kit). ACF argue that there are some collinearity
issues between  l and ht(.).
Regarding the LP methodology, the issue is whether there is any variation of lit that
is independent of the non-parametric term ht(.). They argue three di↵erent scenarios
where collinearity would be present. In the first scenario, lit and mit are decided at
the same time. In this case, if they are both jointly determined, then it is clear that
the choice of labor should also be a function of the productivity shock and the stock of
capital. Recall that:
mit = mt(!it, kit) then it should be that: lit = lt(!it, kit)
Therefore, since !it = ht(mit, kit), then: lit = lt(ht(mit, kit), kit) = gt(mit, kit) where
lit is some function of mit and kit. Therefore, lit is collinear with the non-parametric
function.
In the second scenario, where lit is decided before mit, then the appropriate function
determining the level of intermediate inputs would be:
mit = mt(!it, kit, lit)
This would create a clear correlation with lit in equation (24). The third scenario
is when lit is decided after mit. In this scenario, if the productivity shock !it occurs in
27 Recall that in the LP methodology, investment is replaced by intermediate inputs m.
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between the decision of buying intermediate inputs and hiring labor, then the collinear-
ity disappears. However, this contradicts the assumption that the inversion of the
investment function will solve the endogeneity problem.
For the OP methodology, the reasoning is similar. In order to get proper identifica-
tion of  l in equation (24) it is necessary that there is some variation of lit. ACF assume
that there could be some potential optimization error or measurement error that could
lead to variation of lit. However, these, on average, will approach zero.
They propose an approach that takes into account the possibility of collinearity
between lit and ht(iit, kit). Consider the production function in logs:28
yit =  llit +  kkit + !it + ⌘it (25)
Then, following LP, the intermediate input function is:
mit = mt(!it, kit)
Which is assumed to be monotonic and can be inverted, yielding:
!it = ht(mit, kit)
Now, in order to take into account the collinearity issues discussed above, we should
have:
lit = lt(!it, kit) = lt(ht(mit, kit), kit) = gt(mit, kit)
If we substitute this into equation (25):
yit =  lgt(mit, kit) +  kkit + ht(mit, kit) + ⌘it
Then the estimating equation becomes:
yit =  0 +  (mit, kit) + ⌘it (26)
In this equation,  (mit, kit) combines all the production function terms, including
lit. Moreover,  l is not identifiable from this equation, however; the  (.) function can
be estimated non-parametrically following the spirit of OP and LP. Therefore, it is
possible to obtain values of d (.).
Now, similarly as in OP and LP, in a second stage, the estimating equation is similar
to the procedure described in the Olley and Pakes section, equation (23):
28 In this production function, yit is value added, that is, net of materials.
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Vit =  llit +  kkit + g( it 1    kkit 1    llit 1)
+ f( it 1    kkit 1    llit 1)cPit + ⌘it (27)
The estimation has to be performed using either non-linear least squares, or an
optimization routine.
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Table 13: TFP Estimation
INDUSTRY 24 25 26
METHOD 15 17 18 19 20 21 22 24 25 26 28 29 31 33 34 35 36
OLS
No. of Obs. 10,764 1,656 1,773 883 2,320 1,026 1,716 2,033 2,144 1,816 2,473 1,844 499 205 482 296 1,608
Inskilled 0.49 0.43 0.40 0.45 0.28 0.63 0.45 0.51 0.36 0.51 0.37 0.48 0.38 0.40 0.64 0.47 0.54
Inunskilled 0.41 0.40 0.41 0.41 0.09 0.29 0.33 0.19 0.30 0.23 0.33 0.37 0.34 0.27 0.48 0.33 0.51
Inkstock 0.30 0.27 0.33 0.39 0.46 0.32 0.38 0.38 0.40 0.24 0.35 0.28 0.30 0.40 0.37 0.33 0.21
RTS 1.20 1.10 1.15 1.25 0.83 1.24 1.16 1.07 1.06 0.97 1.06 1.13 1.02 1.08 1.49 1.13 1.26
TORNQVIST INDEX No. of Obs. 8,400 1,295 1,365 681 1,793 818 1,338 1,598 1,672 1,406 1,903 1,414 388 163 366 222 1,211
Inskilled 0.16 0.13 0.15 0.14 0.08 0.07 0.17 0.08 0.08 0.11 0.14 38.00 0.09 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.13
Inunskilled 0.22 0.21 0.19 0.26 0.40 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.34 0.17 0.18 0.14 0.16 0.15 0.22 1.18 0.20
Inkstock 0.62 0.66 0.66 0.60 0.52 0.82 0.71 0.80 0.58 0.72 0.68 0.47 0.75 0.71 0.65 -0.31 0.67
RTS 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
OP Manually No. of Obs. 4,477 696 578 302 1,088 500 755 1,170 1,064 748 1,044 765 219 95 173 134 543
Inskilled 0.27 0.33 0.21 0.25 0.11 0.17 0.26 0.39 0.23 0.33 0.26 0.36 0.28 0.40 0.44 0.28 0.37
Inunskilled 0.18 0.28 0.24 0.30 0.05 0.05 0.20 0.17 0.19 0.17 0.23 0.30 0.28 0.26 0.36 0.24 0.38
Inkstock 0.12 0.15 0.24 0.07 0.13 0.03 0.28 0.13 0.22 0.09 0.17 0.06 0.06 0.32 0.29 0.11 0.08
RTS 0.56 0.76 0.69 0.62 0.29 0.25 0.74 0.68 0.63 0.59 0.65 0.72 0.62 0.99 1.09 0.62 0.84
Olley and Pakes No. of Obs. 5,604 851 729 388 1,354 618 956 1,468 1,342 961 1,312 969 283 121 218 177 709
Inskilled 0.16 0.20 0.16 0.12 0.10 0.31 0.36 0.15 0.21 0.04 0.23 0.03 0.28 0.29 0.21 0.22 0.26
Inunskilled 0.27 0.33 0.21 0.25 0.10 0.18 0.26 0.38 0.23 0.33 0.26 0.36 0.28 0.40 0.45 0.29 0.38
Inkstock 0.18 0.28 0.24 0.30 0.06 0.06 0.19 0.16 0.19 0.17 0.23 0.29 0.29 0.27 0.35 0.22 0.38
RTS 0.61 0.81 0.61 0.67 0.26 0.55 0.81 0.69 0.63 0.55 0.72 0.68 0.84 0.97 1.01 0.73 1.02
Levinsohn and Petrin No. of Obs. 10,733 1,654 1,771 875 2,317 1,025 1,709 1,953 2,143 1,777 2,469 1,834 499 205 482 296 1,607
Inskilled 0.22 0.34 0.24 0.32 0.14 0.20 0.26 0.46 0.25 0.23 0.27 0.40 0.29 0.38 0.54 0.41 0.38
Inunskilled 0.17 0.31 0.23 0.29 0.07 0.11 0.20 0.17 0.21 0.09 0.24 29.00 0.25 0.18 0.36 0.28 0.37
Inkstock 0.14 0.16 0.17 0.14 0.14 0.07 0.19 0.17 0.23 0.09 0.18 0.11 0.26 0.38 0.26 0.16 0.14
RTS 0.53 0.81 0.64 0.75 0.35 0.38 0.65 0.80 0.69 0.41 0.69 0.80 0.80 0.94 1.16 0.84 0.88
ACF* No. of Obs. 8,400 1,295 1,365 681 1,793 818 1,338 1,598 1,672 1,406 1,903 1,414 388 163 366 222 1,212
Inskilled 0.35 0.48 0.42 0.28 0.40 0.56 0.42 0.54 0.36 0.42 0.36 0.54 0.19 0.47 0.47 0.62 0.46
Inunskilled 0.34 0.64 0.35 0.39 0.29 0.56 0.29 0.21 0.32 0.30 0.34 0.49 0.05 0.42 0.52 0.34 0.56
Inkstock 0.13 0.16 0.22 0.15 0.13 0.06 0.20 0.15 0.21 0.16 0.21 0.10 0.18 0.18 0.16 0.14 0.12
RTS 0.81 1.28 1.00 0.82 0.81 1.18 0.91 0.90 0.90 0.88 0.91 1.14 0.42 1.06 1.14 1.11 1.13
* Ackerberg, Caves, and Fraser
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D. Robustness tests
Table 14: No Foreign Presence
Dependent variable log (TFP) No IPR Fraser IPR Dummy IPR
Horizontal Spillovers 0.02 -0.25 -0.21
(0.96) (0.46) (0.24)
Backward Spillovers 4.15** 3.37*** 1.41***
(1.80) (0.58) (0.44)
Forward Spillovers -2.52** -1.22* -0.06
(1.20) (0.73) (0.39)
IPR Fraser -0.58***
(0.22)
IPR Fraser x Horizontal Spillovers 0.01
(0.06)
IPR Fraser x Backward Spillovers -0.40***
(0.05)
IPR Fraser x Forward Spillovers 0.23**
(0.09)
Dummy IPR 0.11***
(0.04)
Dummy IPR x Horizontal Spillovers -0.00
(0.17)
Dummy IPR x Backward Spillovers -1.10***
(0.15)
Dummy IPR x Forward Spillovers 0.70**
(0.28)
Kleibergen-Paap LM Statistic 0.00 0.00 0.00
(under-identification test)
Hansen J Statistic (over-identification test) 0.21 0.65 0.65
Observations 2,884 8,932 8,932
Time, Industry and Region Dummies YES YES YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0. 1
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Table 15: No Foreign Presence.
Balanced Panel
Dependent variable: log (TPF) No. IPR Fraser IPR Dummy IPR
Horizontal Spillovers 0.79 0.31 0.22
(1.01) (0.59) (0.32)
Backward Spillovers 1.20 2.49*** 0.77
(1.96) (0.76) (0.54)
Forward Spillovers -2.47** -2.12** -0.77*
(1.23) (0.87) (0.45)
IPR Fraser -0.39
(0.25)
IPR Fraser x Horizontal Spillovers -0.02
(0.07)
IPR Fraser x Backward Spillovers -0.35***
(0.07)
IPR Fraser x Forward Spillovers 0.29**
(0.11)
Dummy IPR 0.13***
(0.04)
Dummy IPR x Horizontal Spillovers -0.09
(0.21)
Dummy IPR x Backward Spillovers -0.98***
(0.20)
Dummy IPR x Forward Spillovers 0.84**
(0.33)
Kleibergen-Paap P-value 0.00 0.00 0.00
Hansen J Statistic P-value 0.31 0.40 0.38
Observations 2,337 7,227 7,227
Time, Industry and Region Dummies YES YES YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0. 1
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Table 16: No Horizontal Spillovers
Dependent variable: log (TFP) No IPR Fraser IPR Dummy IPR
Backward Spillovers 4.26*** 2.66*** 1.13***
(1.30) (0.55) (0.41)
Forward Spillovers -2.84*** -1.33*** -0.30
(0.79) (0.48) (0.29)
IPR Fraser -0.53**
(0.22)
IPR Fraser x Backward Spillovers -0.31***
(0.07)
IPR Fraser x Forward Spillovers 021***
(0.07)
Dummy IPR 0.10***
(0.03)
Dummy IPR x Backward Spillovers -0.90***
(0.21)
Dummy IPR x Forward Spillovers 0.61***
(0.20)
Kleibergen-Paap LM Statistic (under-identification test) 0.00 0.00 0.00
Hansen J Statistic (over-identification test) 0.63 0.62 0.63
Observations 2,884 8,932 8,932
Time, Industry and Region Dummies YES YES YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0. 1
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Table 17: No Horizontal Spillovers.
Balanced Panel
Dependent variable: log (TFP) No IPR Fraser IPR Dummy IPR
Backward Spillovers 2.43 2.12*** 0.93**
(1.90) (0.67) (0.42)
Forward Spillovers -2.26* -1.56*** -0.51*
(1.16) (0.50) (0.26)
IPR Fraser -0.56***
(0.21)
IPR Fraser x Backward Spillovers -0.25***
(0.09)
IPR Fraser x Forward Spillovers 0.22***
(0.07)
Dummy IPR 0.13***
(0.03)
Dummy IPR x Backward Spillovers -0.71***
(0.25)
Dummy IPR x Forward Spillovers 0.63***
(0.20)
Kleibergen-Paap P-value 0.00 0.00 0.00
Hansen J Statistic P-value 0.12 0.63 0.62
Observations 2,409 7,227 7,227
Time, Industry and Region Dummies YES YES YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0. 1
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Table 18: No Foreign Presence/Horizontal Spillovers
Dependent variable: log (TFP) No IPR Fraser IPR Dummy IPR
Backward Spillovers 4.26*** 3.13*** 1.13***
(1.23) (0.44) (0.41)
Forward Spillovers -2.57*** -1.56*** -0.30
(0.73) (0.47) (0.29)
IPR Fraser -0.51**
(0.20)
IPR Fraser x Backward Spillovers -0.39***
(0.04)
IPR Fraser x Forward Spillovers 0.25***
(0.06)
Dummy IPR 0.10***
(0.03)
Dummy IPR x Backward Spillovers -0.90***
(0.21)
Dummy IPR x Forward Spillovers 0.61***
(0.20)
Kleibergen-Paap LM Statistic (under-identification test) 0.00 0.00 0.00
Hansen J Statistic (over-identification test) 0.31 0.78 0.62
Observations 2,884 8,932 8,932
Time, Industry and Region Dummies YES YES YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0. 1
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Table 19: No Foreign Presence/Horizontal Spillovers.
Balanced Panel
Dependent variable: log (TFP) No IPR Fraser IPR Dummy IPR
Backward Spillovers 3.65** 2.79*** 1.08***
(1.57) (0.55) (0.36)
Forward Spillovers -2.67*** -1.85*** -0.56**
(0.95) (0.46) (0.25)
IPR Fraser -0.53***
(0.20)
IPR Fraser x Backward Spillovers -0.35***
(0.06)
IPR Fraser x Forward Spillovers 0.27***
(0.06)
Dummy IPR 0.14***
(0.04)
Dummy IPR x Backward Spillovers -0.98***
(0.18)
Dummy IPR x Forward Spillovers 0.76***
(0.17)
Kleibergen-Paap P-value 0.00 0.00 0.00
Hansen J Statistic P-value 0.38 0.63 0.62
Observations 2,409 7,227 7,227
Time, Industry and Region Dummies YES YES YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0. 1
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Table 20: Horizontal is not used as Instrument
Dependent variable: log (TFP) No IPR Fraser IPR Dummy IPR
Backward Spillovers 4.47** 3.08*** 1.32***
(1.77) (0.54) (0.51)
Forward Spillovers -2.71** -1.58*** -0.46
(1.10) (0.53) (0.39)
IPR Fraser -0.55**
(0.22)
1PR Fraser x Backward Spillovers -0.37***
(0.06)
IPR Fraser x Forward Spillovers 0.24***
(0.07)
Dummy IPR 0.11**
(0.04)
Dummy IPR x Backward Spillovers -0.85***
(0.23)
Dummy IPR x Forward Spillovers 0.56**
(0.22)
Kleibergen-Paap LM Statistic (under-identification test) 0.00 0.00 0.00
Hansen J Statistic (over-identification test) 0.25 0.48 0.44
Observations 2,884 8,932 8,932
R-squared 0.00 0.00 0.00
Time, Industry and Region Dummies YES YES YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0. 1
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Table 21: Horizontal is not used as Instrument.
Balanced Panel
Dependent variable: log (TFP) No IPR Fraser IPR Dummy IPR
Backward Spillovers 3.82* 2.21*** 0.75
(2.08) (0.76) (0.47)
Froward Spillovers -2.80** -1.57*** -0.41
(1.32) (0.55) (0.31)
IPR Fraser -0.49**
(0.22)
IPR Fraser x Backward Spillovers -0.31***
(0.07)
IPR Fraser x Forward Spillovers 0.25***
(0.06)
Dummy IPR 0.14***
(0.04)
Dummy IPR x Backward Spillovers -0.88***
(0.21)
Dummy IPR x Forward Spillovers 0.71***
(0.18)
Kleibergen-Paap P-value 0.00 0.00 0.00
Hansen J Statistic P-value 0.22 0.37 0.37
Observations 2,409 7,227 7,227
Time, Industry and Region Dummies YES YES YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0. 1
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E. FDI Vs. Licensing
Table 22: Descriptive Statistics (Low-Tech vs. High-Tech Firms)
Variable Low-Tech Firms (31,300 firms) High-Tech Firms (2,308 firms)
Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max
Capital Stock 1509.42 9322.24 0 680,000 8057.26 48590.63 0 953,000
% Domestic Capital 96.73 16.63 0 100 79.89 38.39 0 100
% Foreign Capital 3.26 16.59 0 100 20.11 38.39 0 100
Value Added 1758.89 8594.42 0 470,000 10496.43 66820.67 0.51 1,720,000
Sale of Production 2934.43 11245.13 0 367,000 16126 105000.00 0 1,770,000
Total Wages 331.84 1793.99 0 275,000 978.91 4879.48 1.87 205,000
Gross Production Value 4078.29 15670.79 2.28 504,000 24622.16 168000.00 6.17 3,480,000
Licenses and Foreign Assistance 4.12 72.84 0 5,578 63 515.47 0 11,864
Income Due to Exports 945.39 6913.39 0 311,000 3118.39 21210.31 0 401,000
Number of Skilled Workers 12.36 43.71 0 1,554 23.08 74.04 0 1,057
Skilled/Unskilled Workers Ratio 0.64 3.39 0 159 0.98 5.03 0 139
Skilled/Total Workers Ratio 0.24 0.3 0 1 0.24 0.29 0 1
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